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Capabilities: From Spinoza to Sen and Beyond
Part
I : Spinoza’s Theory of Capabilities
(Part
II: A Spinoza-Sen Economics Research Program
will appear in the next issue)
Jorge Buzaglo (University of
Gothenburg, Sweden)
In a
recent article in this review, Emmanuelle Benicourt (2002) challenges
heterodox economists to explain why they consider Amartya Sen’s
theoretical approach a real force for reform in economics. I would like to
communicate here what I see as a real force for change in Amartya Sen’s
approach to the economic dimension of human development. I would like to
describe some of the genealogy of the approach, and also to show the
potential that this critical tradition has for the renewal of economics.
Before I
embark in my task I would like to refer to Emmanuelle Benicourt’s
orthodox/heterodox partition of economics, which I do not think is very
useful. Both categories are too heterogeneous to be helpful. If we
consider what I think is a more useful categorization, that between
conventional and progressive economics (or similar characterizations, such
as conservative/radical, bourgeois/socialist, etc.), we will find orthodox
and heterodox economists in both categories. Amartya Sen, for instance, is
an orthodox economist, as both he and Emmanuelle Benicourt point out
(Amartya Sen says “mainstream economist”). He is an orthodox economist
because he uses the conventional apparatus of ordinary neoclassical
theory. But as I see it, he
is a progressive orthodox
economist, since he applies this conventional apparatus to the advancement
of a progressive cause, namely, the cause of equality.1 The
equality he advocates is not merely economistic/utilitarian, but refers
also to all other dimensions (“functionings”) of human existence. A quite
radical message indeed, articulated in the suave and diplomatic language
of neoclassical economics. One can only speculate if this is an Aesopian
strategy of telling subversive truths in covered language, or if it would
be better or more effective to develop a more appropriate heterodox idiom
to say the same thing. But it must be admitted that many a heterodox
economist would shy away from so radical an objective for economic science
and human development.
I will
argue here that Sen’s radical approach to human welfare is not new, and
that the original source of the approach contains other important and deep
insights. I will also argue that this same source inspires some
present-day approaches to natural science, and could also inspire the
renewal of economics that Emmanuelle Benicourt longs for.
The “hideous hypothesis” of The
Ethics
The
source I am thinking of is The
Ethics of Baruch de
Spinoza.2 Spinoza’s doctrine of capabilities in The Ethics prefigures rather
explicitly Amartya Sen’s ideas, but it does not seem that Sen was aware of
it. For one thing, Amartya Sen is very open and magnanimous with his
sources and credits ─ he refers to Aristoteles’ Nicomachian Ethics, Marx’s Manuscript of 1844 and Adam
Smith’s Wealth of Nations as
sources of inspiration.3 Also, the doctrine of capabilities, in
spite of its crucial importance in Spinoza’s message, if barely mentioned,
is not given the importance it deserves in most of the expositions,
commentaries and criticisms of The Ethics I am aware of.4
This was perhaps due to the fact that the doctrine appears among what are
considered the most difficult and “mystical” propositions of the last half
of Part 5, which usually repulse narrowly conceived positivism. In these
last propositions Spinoza explains when and in what sense the human mind
can be said to be eternal.
In
effect, in 5.39 (Part 5, Proposition 39), Spinoza affirms
that
He, who possesses a body
capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the
greatest part is eternal.5
Let us
recall that The Ethics is composed in the
axiomatic-deductive mode, with all propositions deduced from preceding
propositions, lemmas, axioms and definitions.6 Proposition 5.39 is demonstrated
as follows.
Proof. He, who possesses a body capable of
the greatest number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions
which are evil ([by proposition] 4.38) ─ that is (4.30) those emotions
which are contrary to our nature; therefore (5.10), he possesses the power
of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to
the intellectual order, and, consequently [5.14, missing in the Elwes
version], of bringing it about,
that all the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of
God [or Nature, or Substance; i.e. self caused, infinite, eternal
being]; whence it will come to pass
that (5.15) he will be affected with love toward God, which (5.16) must
occupy or constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore (5.33), such a
man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal.
QED.
The
first proposition referred to in the proof is crucial for the
understanding of Spinoza’s doctrine of capability. Proposition 4.38 states
that
Whatsoever disposes the human
body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number
of ways, or affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is
useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered
more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased
number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in
this respect is hurtful to man.
Proof:
Whatsoever thus increases the
capabilities of the body increases also the mind’s capability of
perception (2.14); therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and renders it
capable, is necessarily good or useful (4.26, 4.27); and is so in
proportion to the extent to which it can render the body capable;
contrariwise (2.14, 4.26, 4.27), it is hurtful, if it renders the body in
this respect less capable. QED.
That is,
the proof says that whatsoever increases the capabilities of the body also
increases the mind’s capability of understanding. And what increases our
power of understanding is certainly good.
In order
to prove that whatsoever increases the body’s capabilities also increases
the capabilities of the mind, the proof uses Proposition 2.14, which
states that
The human mind is
capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion as
its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions.
Spinoza could also have stated that the reciprocal
statement is also true; that whatsoever increases the capabilities of the
mind augments also the capabilities of the body. That is, the proof could
have used the often quoted Proposition 2.7, base of Spinoza’s so called
body/mind “parallelism” theory:
The order and
connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connection of
things.
The Note to this proposition further affirms this same
idea, that is, that
[…] substance
thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance [God or
Nature], comprehended now through
one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and
the idea of that mode are one and the same thing. This truth seems to have
been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God’s
intellect, and the things understood by God are
identical.
Now, we know also from the Note to Proposition 2.1
that
[…] in proportion as a thinking being is
conceived as thinking more thoughts [or, what is the same, as an
extended being is conceived as capable of more activities], so it is conceived as containing
more reality or perfection.
This relationship between increased capabilities and
increased perfection or reality can be used for an alternative explanation
of our starting Proposition 5.39, on the relationship between capability
and eternity. Spinoza affirms in the same Note to 2.1:
Therefore a being which can think
an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways [or, what
is the same, which can perform infinite acts in an infinite number of
ways], is, necessarily, in respect
of thinking [or in respect of extension], infinite."
Infinite thoughts are timeless, eternal thoughts. A being
capable of thinking infinite thoughts would be thinking eternal thoughts.
Such a being would be so sharing, as to say, in eternity, insofar as it
thinks infinite/eternal thoughts.7 Also, psychophysical
identity (“parallelism”) would suggest that a mind which is thinking
infinite thoughts has an extended correlate which is performing infinite
acts. This would be one way of interpreting the relationship between
capability and eternity in Proposition 5.39.
Spinoza’s demonstration of 5.39 quoted above recurs to his
idea of scientia intuitiva. The
proof says that the larger the capabilities of the body, the greater the
faculties of the mind (and vice versa, we should add); in particular, the
greater is the capability of the mind of rationally comprehending its
emotions. The mind will be thus more able to form clear and distinct
ideas; that is, ideas that can be referred to the idea of God or Nature,
since whatsoever is (or is conceived in the mind), is in God or Nature.
Spinoza calls this ability of the mind scientia intuitiva, and this type
of knowledge third kind of
knowledge, by which the mind conceives things under the form of
eternity (sub specie
aeternitatis).8 Now, the mind, regarding its own power of
comprehension, is affected of pleasure, being this pleasure accompanied by
the idea of God or Nature (so much the more in proportion as it
understands itself and its emotions). According to Spinoza, pleasure
accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love. Pleasure accompanied
by the idea of God or Nature is what Spinoza calls intellectual love of God. This
intellectual love is an activity whereby God or Nature ─ insofar it can be
explained through the human mind ─ regards itself accompanied by the idea
of itself. Since God or Nature is an absolutely infinite being, this love
of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God or Nature loves
itself. This love, this knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, is
possible for the mind insofar as it conceives its own body under the form
of eternity. And this idea, which expresses the essence of the body under
the form of eternity, is necessarily eternal.
The above ideas are indeed difficult and
mind-boggling.9 They nevertheless clearly point towards the
idea of human growth or human perfection as the increasing realm of human
capabilities of thought and activity, that is, of effective freedom (cf.
Sen 1999). Human perfection depends on expanded domains of activity for
every individual on every conceivable dimension of human existence, which
implies also increased domains of knowledge and understanding in enlarged
dimensions of thought. Human development does not depend on increased levels of
“utility” derived from consumption.10
Notes
1. There are many well known
economists in this category. Serge-Christophe Kolm could for instance be
mentioned, as a continental member of this class.
2. The “hideous
hypothesis” of “that famous atheist” was “the doctrine of the simplicity
of the universe, and the unity of that substance, in which he supposes
both thought and matter to inhere” (Hume 1911 [1739-40], p. 229). (I must
say that I do not agree with the word “simplicity” in Hume’s description;
the reasons why will be apparent in what follows.) According to
Jonathan Israel (2001, p. 159)
“hideous” could had been an ironic characterization. Hume belonged in fact
to the same banned category of radical Enlightenment thinkers such as
Diderot, Voltaire and Spinoza himself (Israel 2001, p.109). Curiously,
Diderot’s article on Spinoza in the Encyclopédie could be also said to
be “ironic.”
3. See for instance Sen
(1988). By the way, the young Marx was a dedicated student of Spinoza (see
e.g. Rubel 1978). Aristoteles’ ideas do not exactly prefigure Sen’s (or
Spinoza’s) notion of capabilities ─
see e.g. the discussion of the “Aristotelian Principle” in Rawls
(1999, § 65).
4. As an assiduous reader of
Spinoza literature, I know that I am aware of only one small portion of
it. According for instance to the Swedish bibliographic database (http://www.libris.kb.se/) there are
743 Spinoza related books in Nordic libraries ─ 42 of them published in
2001-2002. (Journal articles must most probably be counted in the
thousands. There are also several Spinoza websites.) The increasing rate
of publication may perhaps be announcing the near fulfilment of
Lichtenberg’s (1990 [1800-1806], p.115) famous prediction: “If the world
should endure for an incalculable number of years the universal religion
[ethics] will be a purified Spinozism. Left to itself, reason can lead to
nothing else and it is impossible that it ever will lead to anything
else.”
5. I quote from the Elwes’
version in compact disc in Lire
l’Éthique de Spinoza, Phronésis, Paris, 1998.
6. The title of The Ethics in the original is Ethica ordine geometrico
demonstrata. Possibly Spinoza chose this mode of argumentation because
of its overwhelming power of conviction. For many centuries The Elements of Euclid was second
only to The Bible in number of
extant copies. Also, the prominence of mathematics and natural science was
rapidly growing in XVIIth century Europe.
7. For a suggestive
comparison of this insight with the insight of meditation, see Wetlesen
(1977).
8. Spinoza’s first and second
kinds of knowledge can be succinctly described as hearsay or opinion and
science respectively.
9. But all things excellent are as difficult as
they are rare. Spinoza’s own reply in the last
words of The Ethics comes
naturally to the mind.
10. Increased levels of passive consumption or leisure,
from The Ethic’s perspective,
might indeed be seen as lessening
human perfection. Cf. Proposition 5.4: In proportion as each thing possesses
more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice
versâ, in proportion as it is more
active, so it is more perfect. But of course in most cases increasing
capabilities involve increased consumption and/or
investment.
References
Benicourt, Emmanuelle, 2002, “Is Amartya Sen a Post-Autistic
Economist?” post-autistic economics
review, Issue no. 15, September 4.
Hume, David, 1911 [1739-40], Treatise of Human Nature - Volume I, J.M.Dent & Sons,
London.
Israel, Jonathan I., 2001, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and
the Making of Modernity 1650-1750, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Lichtenberg, Georg C., 1990 [1800-1806], Aphorisms, Penguin, London
.
Rawls, John, 1999, A
Theory of Justice – Revised Edition, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Rubel, Maximilien, 1978, “Marx à la rencontre de Spinoza”, Économies et Sociétés, Jan.Feb.,
vol.12, pp.239-65.
Sen, Amartya, 1988, “The Concept of Development,” in H. Chenery
and T.N. Srinivasan (eds.), Handbook of Development Economics –
Volume I, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Sen, Amartya, 1999, Development as Freedom, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Wetlesen, Jon, 1977, “Body awareness as a gateway to eternity,”
in S. Hessing (ed.), Speculum
Spinozanum, 1677-1977, Routledge, London.
(Part
II: A Spinoza-Sen Economics Research Program
will appear in the next issue)
______________________________
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Jorge
Buzaglo, “Capabilities: From Spinoza to Sen and Beyond. Part I : Spinoza’s
Theory of Capabilities”, post-autistic economics review, issue no.
20, 3 June 2003, article 6,
http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue20.htm
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