What are the general conclusions to be drawn from the Nigerian experience? The first is the tension between economic liberalization and political authoritarianism. Economic liberalization imposes tremendous hardships on disadvantaged groups and undermines the social contract of the post-colonial development model.¹⁰ Experiences elsewhere, such as in Latin America and Eastern Europe, show that democratic régimes come under considerable pressure as they try to manage complex transition programmes in the context of economic crisis and restructuring. Attempts to impose a sense of realism on the population, i.e. getting people to accept the macro-economic policies of stabilization, is often accompanied by calls for welfare support, which would entail some relaxation of budgetary discipline. The need to make concessions to vulnerable groups has been recognized by most governments. The international financial institutions have also been trying to link adjustment policies with poverty alleviation programmes in many African countries.

It is apparent that economic reforms of the type formulated in most African countries in the 1980s will be difficult to implement in a liberal democratic framework. And yet the reforms themselves require a new political legitimacy for their success. Democratization is supposed to provide the basis for a new social contract predicated on new social and political alliances. But the forces in support of the reforms (or those likely to benefit from them) remain fragmented and politically weak. Given the state's continued control of huge oil revenues, most of the dominant social groups still perceive of politics as the struggle for the control and appropriation of public resources. Difficulties in forging a sustainable social alliance¹¹ have contributed to the intensification of authoritarian practices. The adverse conditions created by both economic liberalization and authoritarian rule provide an "enabling environment" for civil groups to press for democratization. Democratization in this context is an antidote to structural adjustment. This distinguishes the democracy movement in Africa from that of Eastern Europe and explains the ambivalence of Western powers and international financial institutions toward the struggles for democracy in Africa.¹² While in support of democracy, they remain opposed to any attempts to change the direction of the economic reforms.

The second conclusion is the contradiction between the dynamic pressures for democratization at the civil arena and the conformist thrust of the political actors at the state level. Democratization requires the liberalization of both civil and political society. Most of the active groups in civil society have not been able to make much impact at the wider political arena. The military and the principal political parties continue to dominate this sphere. The decision by the civil political class to accept the military-decreed parties is an indication of its reluctance to open up the political system to democratic challenges and establish effective links between the pressures in civil society and the democratization of state practices. On the other hand, the strength of the civil groups is compromised by the virtual lack of participation of the peasant communities in the pro-democracy movement. Both the military and the politicians rely on the disarticulations in rural-urban relations, and the patronage networks that arise therefrom, to maintain the status quo at the political level.

Underlying the authoritarian character of democratization is the crisis of state power and capitalist hegemony in civil society. The debate on capitalism in Africa has been concerned primarily with the dominance of capitalist property relations rather than with the social context in which they operate.¹³ Radical political economists tend to assume that the hegemony of the business class and the power élite will naturally follow from the development of capitalism. But the recession and the market reforms seem to have generated an intense ideological and cultural opposition to capitalist rule. The rate of popular rebellions and withdrawals from formal state and transnational projects is a function of weak ruling class hegemony (Rudebeck, 1989 and 1990). This weakness has undermined the capacity of the ruling authorities (both civil and military) and business groups to opt for democratic forms of government. Beckman's advocacy for a "bourgeois democracy" in Africa, with strong pressures from popular forces, is difficult to sustain in this context (Beckman, 1990). As Gutto puts it, African ruling classes "fear free and fair elections" (Gutto, 1988). Elections, conducted fairly, will impose some accountability on state practices and check the excesses of rent-seeking activities. The dilemmas of the ruling groups have meant that in most countries in the continent, popular social movements have come to play a major role in the struggles for democracy. This has not excluded sections of the dominant power groups from joining these forces in the pro-democracy movement.

The central role of the poor and disadvantaged in the democracy project underlines the need to link formal democracy with more substantive forms of popular rule. I highlight two arguments for this linkage. The first, primarily theoretical, is derived from my original formulation of the problem, in which authoritarianism is linked with particular forms of accumulation and social structures. Stable democratization logically assumes significant changes in the structure and forms of accumulation, than an exclusive focus on rules and institution building. Such changes, as we have argued, involve the integration of rural-urban relations, and an improvement in the democratic participation of popular groups in the governance of economic enterprises. This calls for the empowerment of the majority, but socially deprived groups, the provision of popular welfare and the reduction of inequalities.

The second argument is political or normative. Social movements have themselves linked the struggles for democracy with questions of alternative development strategies (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1987; Mamdani, Mkandawire and Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1988). Indeed, it is primarily the debate on how to overcome the economic and political problems of the crisis and economic reforms that has brought to the fore questions of political rights and accountable government. For instance, the original decision of the Nigeria Labour Congress to launch a Labour Party was to provide a platform to strengthen workers' struggles against repression and the economic hardship of structural adjustment (Olukoshi, forthcoming). A Labour Party in government was expected to implement the union's alternative programme to the economic reforms (NLC, 1985).

This linkage between democracy and alternative development questions an aspect of the current African debate that emphasizes the struggle for "democracy in its own right" (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1988b,c; Mkandawire, 1988b; Gutto, 1988; Shivji, 1990; Ibrahim, 1990). Pressures for democratization do not present themselves in such idealist and abstract terms. While it is an ideal to be cherished, democracy must make sense to the interests of the contending social groups. These interests do not have to be narrowly defined as economic; they can also be social and political. Linking democracy to the restructuring of the economy allows individuals and organizations to pose the question of democratic governance of public resources much more sharply. It is a more realistic way of surmounting the colossal tasks of launching underdeveloped crisis economies along the paths of stable and sustainable democratization.

10 The civil war of 1966-1970 seriously weakened the social contract of the early post-colonial model of development. The social contract was re-launched in Gowon's Dawn of National Reconstruction speech of January 1970 (New Nigerian, 1970).

11 Programmes such as MAMSER (mass mobilization for self-reliance) and DFRRI (directorate for food, roads and rural infrastructure) have not achieved their objects of creating a new social order despite the huge resources they command and their co-optation of many professionals.

12 French troops were sent to oil-rich Gabon in 1990 to defend Oman Bongo's régime against the mass demonstrations for democratization.

13 The debates on capitalism in Kenya in the Review of African Political Economy (Nos. 8, 17, 19) and on classes and imperialism in Africa, in Dar es Salaam (Y. Tandon (ed.), State, class and imperialism, Tanzania Publishing House) did not address the social dimensions of capitalism.