OP-ED COLUMNIST 
        The Vietnam Analogy
        By PAUL KRUGMAN 
        Published: April 16, 2004 in The New York Times 
         
         
        Iraq isn't Vietnam. The most important difference is the death toll, which is only a
        small fraction of the carnage in Indochina. But there are also real parallels, and in some
        ways Iraq looks worse. 
        It's true that the current American force in Iraq is much smaller than the Army we sent
        to Vietnam. But the U.S. military as a whole, and the Army in particular, is also much
        smaller than it was in 1968. Measured by the share of our military strength it ties down,
        Iraq is a Vietnam-size conflict. 
        And the stress Iraq places on our military is, if anything, worse. In Vietnam, American
        forces consisted mainly of short-term draftees, who returned to civilian life after their
        tours of duty. Our Iraq force consists of long-term volunteers, including reservists who
        never expected to be called up for extended missions overseas. The training of these
        volunteers, their morale and their willingness to re-enlist will suffer severely if they
        are called upon to spend years fighting a guerrilla war. 
        Some hawks say this proves that we need a bigger Army. But President Bush hasn't called
        for larger forces. In fact, he seems unwilling to pay for the forces we have. 
        A fiscal comparison of George Bush's and Lyndon Johnson's policies makes the Vietnam
        era seem like a golden age of personal responsibility. At first, Johnson was reluctant to
        face up to the cost of the war. But in 1968 he bit the bullet, raising taxes and cutting
        spending; he turned a large deficit into a surplus the next year. A comparable program
        today  the budget went from a deficit of 3.2 percent of G.D.P. to a 0.3 percent
        surplus in just one year  would eliminate most of our budget deficit. 
        By contrast, Mr. Bush, for all his talk about staying the course, hasn't been willing
        to strike anything off his domestic wish list. On the contrary, he used the initial glow
        of apparent success in Iraq to ram through yet another tax cut, waiting until later to
        tell us about the extra $87 billion he needed. And he's still at it: in his press
        conference on Tuesday he said nothing about the $50 billion-to-$70 billion extra that
        everyone knows will be needed to pay for continuing operations. 
        This fiscal chicanery is part of a larger pattern. Vietnam shook the nation's
        confidence not just because we lost, but because our leaders didn't tell us the truth.
        Last September Gen. Anthony Zinni spoke of "Vietnam, where we heard the garbage and
        the lies," and asked his audience of military officers, "Is it happening
        again?" Sure enough, the parallels are proliferating. Gulf of Tonkin attack, meet
        nonexistent W.M.D. and Al Qaeda links. "Hearts and minds," meet "welcome us
        as liberators." "Light at the end of the tunnel," meet "turned the
        corner." Vietnamization, meet the new Iraqi Army. 
        Some say that Iraq isn't Vietnam because we've come to bring democracy, not to support
        a corrupt regime. But idealistic talk is cheap. In Vietnam, U.S. officials never said,
        "We're supporting a corrupt regime." They said they were defending democracy.
        The rest of the world, and the Iraqis themselves, will believe in America's idealistic
        intentions if and when they see a legitimate, noncorrupt Iraqi government  as
        opposed to, say, a rigged election that puts Ahmad Chalabi in charge. 
        If we aren't promoting democracy in Iraq, what are we doing? Many of the more moderate
        supporters of the war have already reached the stage of quagmire logic: they no longer
        have high hopes for what we may accomplish, but they fear the consequences if we leave.
        The irony is painful. One of the real motives for the invasion of Iraq was to give the
        world a demonstration of American power. It's a measure of how badly things have gone that
        now we're told we can't leave because that would be a demonstration of American weakness. 
        Again, the parallel with Vietnam is obvious. Remember the domino theory? 
        And there's one more parallel: Nixonian politics is back. 
        What we remember now is Watergate. But equally serious were Nixon's efforts to suppress
        dissent, like the "Tell It to Hanoi" rallies, where critics of the Vietnam War
        were accused of undermining the soldiers and encouraging the enemy. On Tuesday George Bush
        did a meta-Nixon: he declared that anyone who draws analogies between Iraq and Vietnam
        undermines the soldiers and encourages the enemy.   
        E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com  |