Before Marx, materialism examined the problem of knowledge apart
from the social nature of man and apart from his historical development, and was therefore
incapable of understanding the dependence of knowledge on social practice, that is, the
dependence of knowledge on production and the class struggle. Above all, Marxists
regard man's activity in production as the most fundamental practical activity, the
determinant of all his other activities. Man's knowledge depends mainly on his activity in
material production, through which he comes gradually to understand the phenomena, the
properties and the laws of nature, and the relations between himself and nature; and
through his activity in production he also gradually comes to understand, in varying
degrees, certain relations that exist between man and man. None of this knowledge can be
acquired apart from activity in production. In a classless society every person, as a
member of society, joins in common effort with the other members, enters into definite
relations of production with them and engages in production to meet man's material needs.
In all class societies, the members of the different social classes also enter, in
different ways, into definite relations of production and engage in production to meet
their material needs. This is the primary source from which human knowledge develops.
Man's social practice is not confined to activity in production, but takes many other
forms -- class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic pursuits; in short, as a
social being, man participates in all spheres of the practical life of society. Thus man,
in varying degrees, comes to know the different relations between man and man, not only
through his material life but also through his political and cultural life (both of which
are intimately bound up with material life). Of these other types of social practice,
class struggle in particular, in all its various forms, exerts a profound influence on the
development of man's knowledge. In class society everyone lives as a member of a
particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand
of a class.
Marxists hold that in human society activity in production develops step by step from a
lower to a higher level and that consequently man's knowledge, whether of nature or of
society, also develops step by step from a lower to a higher level, that is, from the
shallower to the deeper, from the one-sided to the many-sided. For a very long period in
history, men were necessarily confined to a one-sided understanding of the history of
society because, for one thing, the bias of the exploiting classes always distorted
history and, for another, the small scale of production limited man's outlook. It was not
until the modern proletariat emerged along with immense forces of production (large-scale
industry) that man was able to acquire a comprehensive, historical understanding of the
development of society and turn this knowledge into a science, the science of Marxism.
Marxists hold that man's social practice alone is the criterion of the truth of his
knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is that man's knowledge is verified
only when he achieves the anticipated results in the process of social practice (material
production, class struggle or scientific experiment). If a man wants to succeed in his
work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results, he must bring his ideas into
correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond,
he will fail in his practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to
make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into
success; this is what is meant by "failure is the mother of success" and "a
fall into the pit, a gain in your wit". The dialectical-materialist theory of
knowledge places practice in the primary position, holding that human knowledge can in no
way be separated from practice and repudiating all the erroneous theories which deny the
importance of practice or separate knowledge from practice. Thus Lenin said, "Practice
is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of
universality, but also of immediate actuality.'' [1] The Marxist
philosophy of dialectical materialism has two outstanding characteristics. One is its
class nature: it openly avows that dialectical materialism is in the service of the
proletariat. The other is its practicality: it emphasizes the dependence of theory on
practice, emphasizes that theory is based on practice and in turn serves practice. The
truth of any knowledge or theory is determined not by subjective feelings, but by
objective results in social practice. Only social practice can be the criterion of truth.
The standpoint of practice is the primary and basic standpoint in the dialectical
materialist theory of knowledge. [2]
But how then does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve practice? This
will become clear if we look at the process of development of knowledge.
In the process of practice, man at first sees only the phenomenal side, the separate
aspects, the external relations of things. For instance, some people from outside come to
Yenan on a tour of observation. In the first day or two, they see its topography, streets
and houses; they meet many people, attend banquets, evening parties and mass meetings,
hear talk of various kinds and read various documents, all these being the phenomena, the
separate aspects and the external relations of things. This is called the perceptual stage
of cognition, namely, the stage of sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these
particular things in Yenan act on the sense organs of the members of the observation
group, evoke sense perceptions and give rise in their brains to many impressions together
with a rough sketch of the external relations among these impressions: this is the first
stage of cognition. At this stage, man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or
draw logical conclusions.
As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense perceptions and
impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change
(leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed.
Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of
things; they grasp the essence, the totality and the internal relations of things. Between
concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative
difference. Proceeding further, by means of judgement and inference one is able to draw
logical conclusions. The expression in San Kuo Yen Yi, [3] "knit
the brows and a stratagem comes to mind", or in everyday language, "let me think
it over", refers to man's use of concepts in the brain to form judgements and
inferences. This is the second stage of cognition. When the members of the observation
group have collected various data and, what is more, have "thought them over",
they are able to arrive at the judgement that "the Communist Party's policy of the
National United Front Against Japan is thorough, sincere and genuine". Having made
this judgement, they can, if they too are genuine about uniting to save the nation, go a
step further and draw the following conclusion, "The National United Front Against
Japan can succeed." This stage of conception, judgement and inference is the more
important stage in the entire process of knowing a thing; it is the stage of rational
knowledge. The real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to
arrive step by step at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective
things, of their laws and of the internal relations between one process and another, that
is, to arrive at logical knowledge. To repeat, logical knowledge differs from perceptual
knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate aspects, the phenomena and
the external relations of things, whereas logical knowledge takes a big stride forward to
reach the totality, the essence and the internal relations of things and discloses the
inner contradictions in the surrounding world. Therefore, logical knowledge is capable of
grasping the development of the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal
relations of all its aspects.
This dialectical-materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge, basing
itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower to the deeper, was never worked out
by anybody before the rise of Marxism. Marxist materialism solved this problem correctly
for the first time, pointing out both materialistically and dialectically the deepening
movement of cognition, the movement by which man in society progresses from perceptual
knowledge to logical knowledge in his complex, constantly recurring practice of production
and class struggle. Lenin said, "The abstraction of matter, of a law of
nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short, all scientific (correct,
serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely."
[4] Marxism-Leninism holds that each of the two stages in the process of
cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting itself as perceptual at
the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but that both are stages in an integrated
process of cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are
not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice
proves that what is perceived cannot at once be comprehended and that only what is
comprehended can be more deeply perceived. Perception only solves the problem of
phenomena; theory alone can solve the problem of essence. The solving of both these
problems is not separable in the slightest degree from practice. Whoever wants to know a
thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is, by living
(practicing) in its environment. In feudal society it was impossible to know the laws of
capitalist society in advance because capitalism had not yet emerged, the relevant
practice was lacking. Marxism could be the product only of capitalist society. Marx, in
the era of laissez-faire capitalism, could not concretely know certain laws peculiar to
the era of imperialism beforehand, because imperialism, the last stage of capitalism, had
not yet emerged and the relevant practice was lacking; only Lenin and Stalin could
undertake this task. Leaving aside their genius, the reason why Marx, Engels, Lenin and
Stalin could work out their theories was mainly that they personally took part in the
practice of the class struggle and the scientific experimentation of their time; lacking
this condition, no genius could have succeeded. The saying, "without stepping outside
his gate the scholar knows all the wide world's affairs", was mere empty talk
in past times when technology was undeveloped. Even though this saying can be valid in the
present age of developed technology, the people with real personal knowledge are those
engaged in practice the wide world over. And it is only when these people have come to
"know" through their practice and when their knowledge has reached him through
writing and technical media that the "scholar" can indirectly "know all the
wide world's affairs". If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of
things directly, you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change
reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact
with them as phenomena; only through personal participation in the practical struggle to
change reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things and comprehend
them. This is the path to knowledge which every man actually travels, though some people,
deliberately distorting matters, argue to the contrary. The most ridiculous person in the
world is the "know all" who picks up a smattering of hearsay knowledge and
proclaims himself "the world's Number One authority"; this merely shows that he
has not taken a proper measure of himself. Knowledge is a matter of science, and no
dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required is definitely the
reverse -- honesty and modesty. If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice
of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by
eating it yourself. If you want to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must
make physical and chemical experiments to change the state of the atom. If you want to
know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution. All genuine
knowledge originates in direct experience. But one cannot have direct experience of
everything; as a matter of fact, most of our knowledge comes from indirect experience, for
example, all knowledge from past times and foreign lands. To our ancestors and to
foreigners, such knowledge was -- or is -- a matter of direct experience, and this
knowledge is reliable if in the course of their direct experience the requirement of
"scientific abstraction", spoken of by Lenin, was -- or is -- fulfilled and
objective reality scientifically reflected, otherwise it is not reliable. Hence a man's
knowledge consists only of two parts, that which comes from direct experience and that
which comes from indirect experience. Moreover, what is indirect experience for me is
direct experience for other people. Consequently, considered as a whole, knowledge of any
kind is inseparable from direct experience. All knowledge originates in perception of the
objective external world through man's physical sense organs. Anyone who denies such
perception, denies direct experience, or denies personal participation in the practice
that changes reality, is not a materialist. That is why the "know-all" is
ridiculous. There is an old Chinese saying, "How can you catch tiger cubs without
entering the tiger's lair?" This saying holds true for man's practice and it also
holds true for the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart from practice.
To make dear the dialectical-materialist movement of cognition arising on the basis of
the practice which changes reality -- to make clear the gradually deepening movement of
cognition -- a few additional concrete examples are given below.
In its knowledge of capitalist society, the proletariat was only in the perceptual
stage of cognition in the first period of its practice, the period of machine-smashing and
spontaneous struggle; it knew only some of the aspects and the external relations of the
phenomena of capitalism. The proletariat was then still a "class-in-itself". But
when it reached the second period of its practice, the period of conscious and organized
economic and political struggles, the proletariat was able to comprehend the essence of
capitalist society, the relations of exploitation between social classes and its own
historical task; and it was able to do so because of its own practice and because of its
experience of prolonged struggle, which Marx and Engels scientifically summed up in all
its variety to create the theory of Marxism for the education of the proletariat. It was
then that the proletariat became a "class-for-itself".
Similarly with the Chinese people's knowledge of imperialism. The first stage was one
of superficial, perceptual knowledge, as shown in the indiscriminate anti-foreign
struggles of the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Yi Ho Tuan Movement, and so
on. It was only in the second stage that the Chinese people reached the stage of rational
knowledge, saw the internal and external contradictions of imperialism and saw the
essential truth that imperialism had allied itself with China's comprador and feudal
classes to oppress and exploit the great masses of the Chinese people. This knowledge
began about the time of the May 4th Movement of 1919.
Next, let us consider war. If those who lead a war lack experience of war, then at the
initial stage they will not understand the profound laws pertaining to the directing of a
specific war (such as our Agrarian Revolutionary War of the past decade). At the initial
stage they will merely experience a good deal of fighting and, what is more, suffer many
defeats. But this experience (the experience of battles won and especially of battles
lost) enables them to comprehend the inner thread of the whole war, namely, the laws of
that specific war, to understand its strategy and tactics, and consequently to direct the
war with confidence. If, at such a moment, the command is turned over to an inexperienced
person, then he too will have to suffer a number of defeats (gain experience) before he
can comprehend the true laws of the war.
"I am not sure I can handle it." We often hear this remark when a comrade
hesitates to accept an assignment. Why is he unsure of himself? Because he has no
systematic understanding of the content and circumstances of the assignment, or because he
has had little or no contact with such work, and so the laws governing it are beyond him.
After a detailed analysis of the nature and circumstances of the assignment, he will feel
more sure of himself and do it willingly. If he spends some time at the job and gains
experience and if he is a person who is willing to look into matters with an open mind and
not one who approaches problems subjectively, one-sidedly and superficially, then he can
draw conclusions for himself as to how to go about the job and do it with much more
courage. Only those who are subjective, one-sided and superficial in their approach to
problems will smugly issue orders or directives the moment they arrive on the scene,
without considering the circumstances, without viewing things in their totality (their
history and their present state as a whole) and without getting to the essence of things
(their nature and the internal relations between one thing and another). Such people are
bound to trip and fall.
Thus it can be seen that the first step in the process of cognition is contact with the
objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception. The second step is
to synthesize the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to
the stage of conception, judgement and inference. It is only when the data of perception
are very rich (not fragmentary) and correspond to reality (are not illusory) that they can
be the basis for forming correct concepts and theories.
Here two important points must be emphasized. The first, which has been stated before
but should be repeated here, is the dependence of rational knowledge upon perceptual
knowledge. Anyone who thinks that rational knowledge need not be derived from perceptual
knowledge is an idealist. In the history of philosophy there is the
"rationalist" school that admits the reality only of reason and not of
experience, believing that reason alone is reliable while perceptual experience is not;
this school errs by turning things upside down. The rational is reliable precisely because
it has its source in sense perceptions, other wise it would be like water without a
source, a tree without roots, subjective, self-engendered and unreliable. As to the
sequence in the process of cognition, perceptual experience comes first; we stress the
significance of social practice in the process of cognition precisely because social
practice alone can give rise to human knowledge and it alone can start man on the
acquisition of perceptual experience from the objective world. For a person who shuts his
eyes, stops his ears and totally cuts himself off from the objective world there can be no
such thing as knowledge. Knowledge begins with experience -- this is the materialism of
the theory of knowledge.
The second point is that knowledge needs to be deepened, that the perceptual stage of
knowledge needs to be developed to the rational stage -- this is the dialectics of the
theory of knowledge. [5] To think that knowledge can stop at the lower,
perceptual stage and that perceptual knowledge alone is reliable while rational knowledge
is not, would be to repeat the historical error of "empiricism". This theory
errs in failing to understand that, although the data of perception reflect certain
realities in the objective world (I am not speaking here of idealist empiricism which
confines experience to so-called introspection), they are merely one-sided and
superficial, reflecting things incompletely and not reflecting their essence. Fully to
reflect a thing in its totality, to reflect its essence, to reflect its inherent laws, it
is necessary through the exercise of thought to reconstruct the rich data of sense
perception, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and
retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the
inside, in order to form a system of concepts and theories -- it is necessary to make a
leap from perceptual to rational knowledge. Such reconstructed knowledge is not more empty
or more unreliable; on the contrary, whatever has been scientifically reconstructed in the
process of cognition, on the basis of practice, reflects objective reality, as Lenin said,
more deeply, more truly, more fully. As against this, vulgar "practical men"
respect experience but despise theory, and therefore cannot have a comprehensive view of
an entire objective process, lack clear direction and long-range perspective, and are
complacent over occasional successes and glimpses of the truth. If such persons direct a
revolution, they will lead it up a blind alley.
Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge remains
to be developed into rational knowledge -- this is the dialectical-materialist theory of
knowledge. In philosophy, neither "rationalism" nor "empiricism"
understands the historical or the dialectical nature of knowledge, and although each of
these schools contains one aspect of the truth (here I am referring to materialist, not to
idealist, rationalism and empiricism), both are wrong on the theory of knowledge as a
whole. The dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the
rational holds true for a minor process of cognition (for instance, knowing a single thing
or task) as well as for a major process of cognition (for instance, knowing a whole
society or a revolution).
But the movement of knowledge does not end here. If the dialectical-materialist
movement of knowledge were to stop at rational knowledge, only half the problem would be
dealt with. And as far as Marxist philosophy is concerned, only the less important half at
that. Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in
understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in
applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist
viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's
statement, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary
movement." [6] But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory
precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely
prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however
good, is of no significance. Knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is
acquired through practice and must then return to practice. The active function of
knowledge manifests itself not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational
knowledge, but -- and this is more important -- it must manifest itself in the leap from
rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws of the
world, must be redirected to the practice of changing the world, must be applied anew in
the practice of production, in the practice of revolutionary class struggle and
revolutionary national struggle and in the practice of scientific experiment. This is the
process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of
cognition. The problem of whether theory corresponds to objective reality is not, and
cannot be, completely solved in the movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the
rational, mentioned above. The only way to solve this problem completely is to redirect
rational knowledge to social practice, apply theory to practice and see whether it can
achieve the objectives one has in mind. Many theories of natural science are held to be
true not only because they were so considered when natural scientists originated them, but
because they have been verified in subsequent scientific practice. Similarly,
Marxism-Leninism is held to be true not only because it was so considered when it was
scientifically formulated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin but because it has been
verified in the subsequent practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary
national struggle. Dialectical materialism is universally true because it is impossible
for anyone to escape from its domain in his practice. The history of human knowledge tells
us that the truth of many theories is incomplete and that this incompleteness is remedied
through the test of practice. Many theories are erroneous and it is through the test of
practice that their errors are corrected. That is why practice is the criterion of truth
and why "the standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the
theory of knowledge". [7] Stalin has well said, "Theory
becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice
gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory." [8]
When we get to this point, is the movement of knowledge completed? Our answer is: it is
and yet it is not. When men in society throw themselves into the practice of changing a
certain objective process (whether natural or social) at a certain stage of its
development, they can, as a result of the reflection of the objective process in their
brains and the exercise of their subjective activity, advance their knowledge from the
perceptual to the rational, and create ideas, theories, plans or programmes which
correspond in general to the laws of that objective process. They then apply these ideas,
theories, plans or programmes in practice in the same objective process. And if
they can realize the aims they have in mind, that is, if in that same process of practice
they can translate, or on the whole translate, those previously formulated ideas,
theories, plans or programmes into fact, then the movement of knowledge may be considered
completed with regard to this particular process. In the process of changing nature, take
for example the fulfilment of an engineering plan, the verification of a scientific
hypothesis, the manufacture of an implement or the reaping of a crop; or in the process of
changing society, take for example the victory of a strike, victory in a war or the
fulfilment of an educational plan. All these may be considered the realization of aims one
has in mind. But generally speaking, whether in the practice of changing nature or of
changing society, men's original ideas, theories, plans or programmes are seldom realized
without any alteration.
This is because people engaged in changing reality are usually subject to numerous
limitations; they are limited not only by existing scientific and technological conditions
but also by the development of the objective process itself and the degree to which this
process has become manifest (the aspects and the essence of the objective process have not
yet been fully revealed). In such a situation, ideas, theories, plans or programmes are
usually altered partially and sometimes even wholly, because of the discovery of
unforeseen circumstances in the course of practice. That is to say, it does happen that
the original ideas, theories, plans or programmes fail to correspond with reality either
in whole or in part and are wholly or partially incorrect. In many instances, failures
have to be repeated many times before errors In knowledge can be corrected and
correspondence with the laws of the objective process achieved, and consequently before
the subjective can be transformed into the objective, or in other words, before the
anticipated results can be achieved in practice. But when that point is reached, no matter
how, the movement of human knowledge regarding a certain objective process at a certain
stage of its development may be considered completed.
However, so far as the progression of the process is concerned, the movement of human
knowledge is not completed. Every process, whether in the realm of nature or of society,
progresses and develops by reason of its internal contradiction and struggle, and the
movement of human knowledge should also progress and develop along with it. As far as
social movements are concerned, true revolutionary leaders must not only be good at
correcting their ideas, theories, plans or programmes when errors are discovered, as has
been indicated above; but when a certain objective process has already progressed and
changed from one stage of development to another, they must also be good at making
themselves and all their fellow-revolutionaries progress and change in their subjective
knowledge along with it, that IS to say, they must ensure that the proposed new
revolutionary tasks and new working programmes correspond to the new changes in the
situation. In a revolutionary period the situation changes very rapidly; if the knowledge
of revolutionaries does not change rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they
will be unable to lead the revolution to victory.
It often happens, however, that thinking lags behind reality; this is because man's
cognition is limited by numerous social conditions. We are opposed to die-herds in the
revolutionary ranks whose thinking fails to advance with changing objective circumstances
and has manifested itself historically as Right opportunism. These people fail to see that
the struggle of opposites has already pushed the objective process forward while their
knowledge has stopped at the old stage. This is characteristic of the thinking of all
die-herds. Their thinking is divorced from social practice, and they cannot march ahead to
guide the chariot of society; they simply trail behind, grumbling that it goes too fast
and trying to drag it back or turn it in the opposite direction.
We are also opposed to "Left" phrase-mongering. The thinking of
"Leftists" outstrips a given stage of development of the objective process; some
regard their fantasies as truth, while others strain to realize in the present an ideal
which can only be realized in the future. They alienate themselves from the current
practice of the majority of the people and from the realities of the day, and show
themselves adventurist in their actions.
Idealism and mechanical materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized
by the breach between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge
from practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies. Marxists
recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of the universe, the
development of each particular process is relative, and that hence, in the endless flow of
absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular process at any given stage of development
is only relative truth. The sum total of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute
truth. [9] The development of an objective process is full of
contradictions and struggles, and so is the development of the movement of human
knowledge. All the dialectical movements of the objective world can sooner or later be
reflected in human knowledge. In social practice, the process of coming into being,
developing and passing away is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being,
developing and passing away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective
reality in accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further
and further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper. The
movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so is man's
cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way exhausted truth but
ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the course of practice. Our
conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of
theory and practice, of knowing ant doing, and we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies,
whether "Left" or Right, which depart from concrete history.
In the present epoch of the development of society, the responsibility of correctly
knowing and changing the world has been placed by history upon the shoulders of the
proletariat and its party. This process, the practice of changing the world, which is
determined in accordance with scientific knowledge, has already reached a historic moment
in the world and in China, a great moment unprecedented in human history, that is, the
moment for completely banishing darkness from the world and from China and for changing
the world into a world of light such as never previously existed. The struggle of the
proletariat and the revolutionary people to change the world comprises the fulfilment of
the following tasks: to change the objective world and, at the same time, their own
subjective world -- to change their cognitive ability and change the relations between the
subjective and the objective world. Such a change has already come about in one part of
the globe, in the Soviet Union. There the people are pushing forward this process of
change. The people of China and the rest of the world either are going through, or will go
through, such a process. And the objective world which is to be changed also includes all
the opponents of change, who, in ord« to be changed, must go through a stage of
compulsion before they can enter the stage of voluntary, conscious change. The epoch of
world communism will be reached when all mankind voluntarily and consciously changes
itself and the world.
Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the
truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge;
then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change
both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and
again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the
content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the
dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical-materialist
theory of the unity of knowing and doing.
NOTES
[1] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's The Science of
Logic". Collected Works, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 205.
[2] See Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach". Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels, Selected Works, in two volumes, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1958,
Vol. II, p. 403, and V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, ring. ed.,
FLPH, Moscow, 1952, pp. 136-4.
[3] San Kuo Yen Yi (Tales of the Three Kingdoms) is a
famous Chinese historical nova by Lo Kuan-chung (late 14th and early 15th century).
[4] V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's The Science of
Logic", Collected Works, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 161.
[5] "In order to understand, it is necessary empirically to
begin understanding, study, to rise from empiricism to the universal." (Ibid., p.
197.)
[6] V. I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?", Collected
Works, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1961, Vol. V, p. 369.
[7] V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Eng.
ed., FLPH, Moscow, p. 141.
[8] J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", Problems
of Leninism, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, p. 31.
[9] See V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Eng.
ed., FLPH, Moscow, pp. 129-36.
